On speech formulas and linguistic competence by Pawley, Andrew
Lenguas Modernas l2 (1985),84-104
Universidad de Chilé
ON SPEECH FORMULAS AND LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE
ANonrw Pew¡-¡y
University of Auckland
'These talks pointed me in the right direction but they did not prove as successful as I had
hoped... My project demanded a richer and more subtle mastery of the language.
(Marjorie Shostak, Nisa: The Lrfe ann Worhs of a lKung Woman'¡
There are many matters of interest to our society and to our species in which language is of
central importance ... I do not believe that the current paradigm of linguistics provides a
good basis for dealing with some, or indeed with most, of these matters. I particularly want to
call into question the view of the nature of language which underlies rhat paradigm.
(George Grace, The Linguistic Corctruction of Reality\.
"Linguistics! How interesting! And how many languages do you know?"I A
conversational problem for which every linguist craves a simple solution. The
questioner expects, in a single word, an answer that is at once friendly, honest and
informative. I must admit that I have never managed to work out a reply combining all
these Gricean virtues. One reason is that I am not sure when it is true to say that one
'knows a language'. We speak of various hinds of linguistic knowledge or competence:
"Reading knowledge required", "conversational fluency essential", "X understands
Spanish but can't speak it", "Y speaks a dialect, not the standard", and so on. We
recognize degrees of competence: "P speaks pretty good Spanish", "Q understands a
Iittle German", "R speaks úith a foreign accent". And in linguistics special technical
notions of linguistic and bilingual competence have developed.
This, then, is the first question that I will be concerned with here: What does it
mean to know a language? In particular, what sorts of knowledge or skills make up the
command of a language shown by mature native speakers? I refer here to spoken not
written language.
The answer is, of course, going to depend on what is meant by 'know' and
'language'. Vernacular understandings of these terms differ from the definitions given
or assumed in many studies in theoretical and descriptive linguistics. I will be primarily
concerned here with senses of 'know' and 'language' which I believe to be widely
rThis paper is based on lectures given at the 1985 Institute of the Linguistic Society of America,
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accepted by ordinary users of English, and which encompass certain linguistic
capacities that are excluded from the grammar-lexicon treatment characteristic of
structural Iinguistics.
My argument will be that mastery of a language in this broad, vernacular sense rests
largely on command of a lexicon of conventional ways of talking about particular
subject matters. The phrase'ways of talking'is borrowed from George Grace, for whom
it is a technical term in his account of how we construct conceptual worlds by means of
language. In order to speak or understand a language properly, Grace says, it is
necessary to know "how to talk about the subject matter of which our effective worlds
are constituted" (1984: l3l); we must know how things are said2. The'how'falls under
the heading of idiomatology, as well as grammar, of forms of expression characteristic
of native speech. The 'things' we say may belong to the realm of idiomatology, too, but
on the side of ideas, meanings and subject matters that are characteristic of a particular
cultural tradition.
' I suspect that this argument will come as no surprise 
- 
may even sound old hat
-to people whosejob is teaching foreign languages or doing translation. I would like tothink that the general idea is close to being an obvious truth. Certainly it is an idea or
assumption which is implicit in the practice of lexicography, as exemplified in the great
dictit¡naries of European languages 
-a point which I will return to later.The problem is to understand the details of this 'truth' and to see if it can be
married to the 'truths' of structural linguistics. Whether these things can be done, and
how they might be done are the second and third questions which will be addressed.
THr: «;nnuuAR-r-cxlc()N MoD[.r- ()F LAN(;uA(;L.
I believe the problem is partly one of understanding different views of what a language
ls.
The terms 'language, 'competence'and'lexicon'each has a technical meaning in
structural linguistics, standing for a more or less well-defined theoretical construct.
'I-he reader may feel that I have begun to play fast and loose with these terms, by using
them in non-technical senses. However, my intention is simply to propose that certain
metalinguistic concepts of the vernacular culture be developed int<¡ technical
constructs. Obviously, it is desirable to avoid using the same term for a pair of different
though related concepts. In some cases, e.g. that of' 'dictionary' versus 'lexicon', a
distinction between vernacular and structuralist labels can easily be made. But not
always. It is hard to find a more convenient name for what laymen mean by'language'
2Grace ( 1981, 1984) discussed at some length what is involved in saying something in a human language.
It is an achievement of quite a dillerent order from the hinting or indicating which is the nearest other
mammals come, in nature, to saying things.
Central to an act of saying something is analytically specifying a conceptual situation, e.g. by a clause
which says who does what where and to whom. But it is not the case that the situations we describe are given by
nature, and that our utterances are simply word-maps ofactual scenes and events. Even when speaking ofthe
mostconcretesituations,e.g.A manwasbittenbladog,ourutterancesfollowprocessesofselectiveperception,
interpretation and structuring of information. Most of the situations which we talk about, however, are better
described as products of human imagination and language.
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itself. It is, however, easier to ñnd a suitable substitute for the sense of 'language'which
has been constructed by theoretical linguists, namely, 'grammar'.
Leaving aside phonology, it is fair to say that linguistics has throughout its history
been largely concerned with the study of grammar- either morphology or syntax.
Around this focus on grammar has developed a certain idea of what a language consists
of. This idea 
- 
call it the grammar view of language 
- 
has its roots in Greek and
Roman scholarship and has persisted, with formal refinements, in 20th century work.
In this view a language is essentially a system of conventions for pairing the form of
sentences with their intrinsic meanings 
- 
those which belong to the forms without
reference to wider discourse context or to extralinguistic factors.
In recent decades, Chomsky's definition of 'linguistic competence' as the native
speaker's knowledge-in-principle of a generative grammar for a particular language
has been widely accepted. A generative grammar specifies all the grammatical
sentences of a language, while excluding ungrammatical strings, and it assigns to each
of an infinite range of sentences a structural description, indicating how competent
speakers understand the sentence. A major component of the grammar is a lexicon,
which contains all and only the unpredictable pairings of form and meaning, i.e.,
morphemes and various sorts of idioms. Lexical items (or lexemes) each have certain
grammatical features or categorizations which determine whether or not they can
occur in certain syntactic environments. Call this the grammar-lexicon model, the
dominant exponent of the grammar view.
While other schools within structural linguistics use different terms the essentials of
the grammar-lexicon model are characteristic of the structuralist tradition as a whole.
Until recently, a descriptive linguist who had compiled both a grammar and a lexicon of
language X could sit back with a satisfied sigh and say "Myjob is done; I have described
the language".
The grammar-lexicon view of language has been an extremely fruitful one,
providing a framework for making sense of a vast amount of data. However, it is
important to remember that it and its various ingredients are no more than constructs.
'Language', like 'grammar', 'lexicon'. 'syntactic rule', etc. as defined by any school of
linguistics, or anyone else, is simply a hypothetical entity, a theoretical notion. The
construct should not be reified and consecrated. It is true that there is some agreement
between diverse observers as to what bits of actual behaviour count as linguistic or
language-related. But the domain of language may be deñned narrowly or broadly,
and each definition may yield a universe that can be made sense of in many ways.
VrnNaculeR uNDERsTANDTNGs ()F KN()wrNG A LAN(;uAGE
In Nü¿, Tlu Life and Worhs of a lKung Woman, the anthropologist Marjorie Shostak
writes as follows of her first months adjusting to Kalahari life and trying to learn the
!Kung language.
I learned two important phrases: "What is the name for that?" and "when I do this, what is it
called?" Using these two questions, combined with some obvious gestures, I was able to elicit a
large vocabulary in a few weeks. ... I struggled to write down the answers, which bore no
relation to any sounds I had ever heard before.
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By the time three months had passed, the lKung sounds had become a little less strange, the
clicks, glottal stops, and fricatives a little more manageable, and I could finally hear the tones
(although it took close to twenty months before I started using them correctly). Polite
formalities could now be exchanged: "How are you this morning, my niece?" "Why I'm fine,
my uncle."
But more was required than finding the lKung equivalents for English words; it was, of
course, necessary to say them correctly, at the appropriate times, and in the culturally
accepted manner. ... By the time I had lived there six months ... I was more at ease with the
language and occasionally succeeded in asking questions that elicited personal answers. At
that point I started to "interview" anyone who was willing and friendly, trying various ways to
ask them about the things they perceived as important in their lives... These talks pointed me
in the right direction, but they did not prove as successful as I had hoped... My project
demanded a richer and more subtle mastery of the language. (Shostak 1983: 17-18).
Shostak goes on to describe a progression in her quest of a "richer and more subtle
mastery of the language", of becoming more fluent, of learning to frame questions
appropriately, of when to be direct and indirect, of how to interpret the meanings and
motives of utterances framed in a certain way or spoken in a certain context. After some
two years she was able to elicit and translate the narratives in which the woman Nisa
vividly recounted her life and philosophy.
From this and other linguistic anecdotes, we can gain impressions of ordinary
language users' understandings of what it takes to know a language. I believe that, in
English-speaking communities and elsewhere, the following elements are widely held
to be part of knowing a language properly. A proper speaker should show nativelike
standards in respect of:
l. a) grammaticality,
b) pronunciation of consonants and vowels,
c) musical conventions: intonation, stress and rhythmic patterns, voice quality,
modulations of volume, etc.
d) productive fluency: conforming to norms of tempo, structure and quantity for
chunking utterance elements into fluent units,
e) hearing fluency: being able to decode fluent speech,
0 idiomaticity: the selection of familiar, nativelike ways of saying things, as
opposed to ways that are merely grammatical,
g) lexical knowledge: including the ability to distinguish between those
expressions that are lexicalised (standard designations) and those that are ad
hoc descfiptions,
h) contextual appropriateness: saying the right thing at the right time,
i) coherence: saying things that make sense in terms of normal understandings of
the world shared by a particular speech group, and in terms of standard
procedures of inference,j) inference: being able to make sense of ordinary discourse, to work out
conversational implicatures, to understand the communicative functions or
intentions of particular utterances,
k) creativity, of various kinds, including:
i) phonological - making up new word forms,
ii) syntactic, (iii) semantic, (iv) contextual 
- 
apt matching of expression with
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situational context in a non-routine way. A distinction (not sharp) may perhaps
be drawn between rule-governed creativity and special kinds of creative use of
la-nguage in which conventions are broken or manipulated to achieve special
effects; as in Pig-Latin, puns, metaphors, etc.
I do not wish to imply that these elements are all sharply distinct and independent,
merely that each is an aspect of linguistic competence that is nameworthy 
- 
distinctive
enough to be categorized separately for purposes of discussion.
Spnr,cH FoRMULAS
The suggestion was made earlier that mastery of a language, as this is understood by
ordinary language users, rests to a considerable extent on knowing conventional ways
of talking about particular subject matters. Can we make this suggestion into a more
precise claim? While we have defined some of the characteristics of native command of
a language, we have so far said little about what is meant by 'conventional ways of
talking'. How do these differ from, say, words, idioms or grammatical constructions?
I will be concerned here with a particular class of ways of talking which I will call
speech fonnulas or, simply , formulass . A speech formula is a conventional pairing of a
particular/ortnal corutruction with a particular conaentional id¿a or idea class. An idea is
conventional in the sense of being part of a cultural tradition 
- 
belonging to the body
of conceptual elements shared by members of a speech community. I use 'idea' rather
than'meaning'or'function'in order to emphasize that the conceptual element is not
simply a byproduct or function of the occurrence of a particular linguistic form. Not
only is the idea familiar, but it has a certain independence from form, perhaps being
expressible by a number of different forms without losing its status as 'the same idea'.
For example, go in and enter may express the same idea. So, too, may He plead.ed guiltl
and H e ent¿red a plea of guilry, or J ohn ashed Mary to marry him, J ohn asked Mary to beco¡ne his
wife, and John proposed to Mary. In these cases the idea itself is a social institution. In a
speech formula a conventional idea is expressed in a certain standard way, i.e., by a
construction form which is recognized as being the usual way of designating the idea, in
contrast to other less usual or ad hoc ways of referring to it.
A (formal) construction consists of two or more syntactic units standing in
construction, e.g. as a complex word, phrase, clause, etc. In a formulaic construction,
the syntactic units may be (i) lexically specified in all cases, i.e. the construction is made
up of a fixed sequence of morphemes, such as A stit{h in time saues nine, or Eaery m.an hns
price, (ii) lexically specified in some cases, as in the formulas Long liae NPI and The
ADJ-er (X), The ADJ-er (Y), discussed below, or (iii) lexically unspecified, i.e. made up of
syntactic categories such as V, N, NP, etc. In the Iast case, however, one or more of the
S'Formula'or'speech formula' has been used in roughly the present sense by many scholars including
Jespersen (1924), without ever becoming a major analytic construct in linguistics. Recently the term
'construction' has been used in a similar sense. I prefér 'formula' to 'construction'---chiefly because, whereas
'construction' carries strong associations with a syntactic type, a string of abstract syntactic categories,
'formula' suggests a recipe for putting things together, where the'things' may be ideas, syntactic categories or
particular words.
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syntactic categories is lexically very restricted; it represents a small class of lexemes,
usually one that forms a semantic set, as in the time-telling formula M PREP H,
discussed below.
A particular realization of a formula may be termed a formulnic expression, or,
loosely, a formula.
As an example of a formula, Jespersen (1924:30) gives Long liue the Kingl and its
congeners Long liue the Qreenlthe Presid¿ntlMr Johnson, etc., which are used to publicly
wish someone well. The formula Long live NPI (cf . Long m,ay she reign!) has the unusual
structure ADVERB SUBJUNCTIVE-VERB SUBJECT; this construction type is no
longer productive in English, except in having a subject constituent which can be rather
freely varied.
Easy does ir! is another formulaic expression, belonging to a small class in which only
the first element is variable (easy, gently, slowly and perhaps a few others), the whole
being used as a directive to someone at the critical phase of a delicate operation. [t is not
only the placement of the adverb first that is unusual here; it is also the use of the third
person singular form of the verb as part of a command. We do not say *Quichly rurcitl or
*Carefully cuts this page!
A formula whose syntactic constituents are wholly or Iargely filled in by particular
morphemes or words is a lexicalised or partly lexicalised formula. Long liae NP! and
lEasylgentlylslowlyl does i¿! fall into this class. A formula whose syntactic elements wholly
or largely consist of syntactic categories may be called a schematic or general formula.
An example of a schematic formula in English is the simile formula NP¡ V li&e NP¡,
as in Sl¿r danced lifu an angel. Another is the comparatlve formula The ADJ-er (X), the
ADJ-er (Y) as in The bigger the better, The bigger thq are th¿ harder thq fall, The sooner she
arriues the sooner ue can go. Ways of telling the time and reckoning weight provide other
examples. In my dialect of English, for instance, one says that the time is M fo H, or M
past H, where M is the number of minutes and H is the hour. M may be reckoned in
terms of minutes or in units of 'a quarter (to or past)' or'half (past)', but not in, say, 'sixths'
or 'thirds' of an hour. The class of prepositions linking M and H is highly restricted in
English; in some places people say before and after instead of to and past.
Formulas have something in common with the familiar analytic constructs'idiom',
'lexical item'and'grammatical construction'but are not adequately covered under any
r>l'these three headings'. All idioms are formulas but not all formulas are idioms (in the
strict sense of a construction with an unpredictable meaning or irregular form); most
are not idioms. Long liae NP! and easy does it! happen to be syntactic idioms (with odd
phrase structure), of which there are relatively few. Drop a brich,in the sense of 'commit
a s«rcial gaffe, behave tactlessly', happens to be a semantic idiom, of which there are
many thousands.
The bulk of formulaic expresions, however, are syntactically and semantically
well-fbrmed. For example, tell tlw truth is a well-formed expression which names a
rOn 
'construction' see fn. 3. For a discussion of various senses and kinds of idiom' see Weinreich 1969,
Makkai 1972. Weinreich points out that the idioms of a language are not a well-defined class; rather, 'idiom'is
a theory-dependent notion. It can be argued that speech formulas are all, at least,'encoding idioms'(Makkai
1972), if not'decoding idioms'. Thar is, while the meaningof a given formulaic expression may be transparent
to the hearer who knows tlie grammar, the grammar provides no clue that that particular expression is tfu
c«¡nventional one fbr that meaning.
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conventional idea. It happens that in English there is no single word antonym of l¡¿, and
while it is possible to say speak truthfully, giue a true account, say what is true, state tht facts,
etc., the phrases tell the truth and speak the truth have greater status as official antonyms of
li¿ 
- 
indicated not only by their frequency of use in everyday speech but by their
required use in courtroom and other rituals. 'I-hat the meaning of tell the t¡uthis part of
our cultural tradition cannot be doubted when a man can be sent to jail for lying to the
court.
Many formulas have a grammar that is partly unique. There are special restrictions
as to how constituents may be moved, inserted, expanded, etc. without destroying the
formula. For example, in the formula Who (EXPLETM)
who do-TENSET NPi ráizfr-TENSEt PROi áa-TENSE,!
the tense cannot be varied from SIMPLE PRESENT or PAST without changing the
force of the expression. We can say, as an indignant reaction to someone's
presumptuous conduct, Who do you thinhyou orsr.,Who the deail do thq think thel arel,but
not *Who do you thinh you will bet., or *Who did t¡ry think thq used to bel The last two
expressions are grammatical as ordinary questions, craving an answer, but they do not
carry the sense of a strong objection to someone's behaviour, which is characteristic of
the formulaic usages. Again, one cannot insert modifiers freely (as in Who, in this
partirular case, did thq apparently thinh thq wne?) without losing the formulaic sense.
Writers on formulas, and related ideas such as 'collocation' and 'compound
lexemes' sometimes define these units solely in terms of their syntactic unity, their
fixedness, in contrast to 'free constructions'. But in most cases such a formal definition
is meaningless, in fact invalid, unless the formal restrictions in question are associated
with a particular meaning or class of meanings or speech functions. Good morning is a
formulaic expression only when it serves as a greeting rather than as a description of the
weather.
TH¡ no¡-¡ oF FoRMULAS rN LtNcuISTtc coMpETENCE
We turn now to the relationship between speech formulas and the various aspects of
linguistic competence distinguished in (l a-k) above. To deal in depth with any one of
these aspects would take a lengthy paper, and here I must conñne myself to summary
remarks on a few of them.
An important function of speech formulas is captured inWebste¡'s definition for
one of the senses of 'formula': "any conventional rule or method for doing something,
especially when used, applied or repeated without thought" (my italics: AP).
Nativelike fluency, as has been argued elsewhere (Bolinger 1975, 1976, Pawley and
Syder 1976, 1983, Wong-Fillmore 1976, Kuiper and Haggo 1983, Peters 1983) is
probably unattainable until the language learner has memorized, a repertoire of
formulas-I would argue, clause and multi-clause length formulay-including many in
which most of the constituents are lexically specified. There is a good deal of evidence
that the human capacity for encoding novel linguistic sequences is limited to a few
words in a single focus of consciousness. A focus of consciousness such as takes place in
planning a novel linguistic sequence is usually associated with a break or slowdown in
the flow of speech (Goldman-Eisler 1968, Pawley and Syder 1976, Chafe 1979, 1980).
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In English and probably many other languages, the connected discourse of native
speakers typically comes in fluent bursts of about three to ten words. A fluent chunk is
usually a single clause, occasionally a multi-clause construction. Howevgr, it is rarely, if
ever, the case that fluent chunks of this order are mainly composed of novel material.
The introduction of more than one or two novel words into a phrase is usually marked
by a break in the flow5. When we examine fluent connected speech closely it turns out to
be composed mainly of formulaic expressions, each of which realizes a schematic or a
(partly) lexicalised formula.
The following extract from a narrative illustrates some of these points. The speaker
is a New Zealander, about 70 years old, recalling scenes from his childhood. Pauses (in
seconds) and shifts of tempo are indicated below each line of text. / indicates stress on
the following syllable; L marks the main or ronic srress in a rone group.
2. /we /had a lfan ltastic /time - - -[slows] (l.l)
/there /were /all §nds of rellations /there/[accel] [slows I
/I dun/no [yhere /they /all [qome /from/[accel], [slows 1
I didn't [!now t'alf o'them - -[accel] (0.9)
and'ah - the §ds /sat on the lfloor - - -(0.2) (1.5)
and ol' /Uncle llert /he /ah/
o'lcourse /he was the [!!fe and soul of the lgrrty[acel] [slows ]
/Uncle /Bert'ad a /black ¡lottle - - -[accel] [slows ] (1.5)
an ah - 'e'd t /tell a /few §ories(0.2) [accel] [slows]
an 'e'd /take a /sip out of the /black [b,ottle/[accel] [slows I
n' the /more /sips he /took /outa /that lLottle - - -[accel] (1.6)
the lworse the /stories ltrt - - -(1.6)
In (2) the narrator uses the following sequence of clause-length constructions, most
of them partly lexicalised formulas. Formulas within formulas are marked off by
square brackets and labels.
scoldman Eisler (1968, esp. chs. 3-4) describes experiments suggesting that hesitations in speech "are
the delays due to processes taking place in the brain whenever speech ceases to be the automatic vocalization
of learned sequences, whether ocassioned by choice of an individual word, by construction of syntax, or by
conception ofcontent" (Goldman-Eisler 1968:58). In a recent unpublished paper Chafe ñnds evidence that
in narrative discourse speakers usually introduce only on€ new concept per burst of fluent (pause-free)
speech, other concepts being previously mentioned or part of a familiar schema.
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3. NP haae - TENSE a [ADJ timtlyp (ADJ : wonderful, fantastir, etc.)
there be - TENSE lall kin"ds of Nf¡p there
NP do - TENSE not Yt fwhere NP coz¿¿-TENSE /roml¡p
NP do - TENSE not Yt lhalf of them)yp
NP si¿ - TENSE on NP
NP á¿ - TENSE the life and soul of the party
NP haue - TENSE ¿ NP
NP would ltell a few storitslyp
NP would ltafu a sip out d NPIVp
the more NP lá¿ ¡¿ors¿ NP geTTENSE
Extensive use of formulas, then, has the advantage of freeing speakers from
concentration on the mechanics of speech production 
- 
the tasks of finding and
articulating words for their thoughts and ensuring that utterances are grammatical and
idiomatic. Using ready-made phrases and clauses as building blocks, speakers can turn
their attenti«¡n to other and higher-order tasks 
- 
framing these blocks into larger
structures, fine-tuning the music of each utterance, taking extra pains with a particular
word choice, and so on.
Let us turn now to idiomaticity. Compare the fragment of actual narrative in (4)
with the paraphrase given in (5):
4. I had four uncles.
1-hey all volunteered to go away.
And ah that was one Christmas - that I'll always remember.
Because ah-my four uncles came round, they were all in uniform, an'ah they are
goin' to have Christmas dinner with us.
And what was more important, they're goin'to provide it.
And that was really something.
5. The brothers of'my parents were fbur.
Their ofTering tr¡ soldier in lands elsewhere in the army of'our country had
occurred.
There is not a time when my remembering that Christmas will n<-¡t take place.
Because of'the coming of the brothers of'my parents
to our house,
having put on their bodies the cl<¡thes of'the army.
The eating of Christmas dinner by them in our
company was to happen,
and above that thing in importance,
the buying of the food by them was to occur.
A thing that was indeed unusual and indeed good.
What we have called elsewhere (Pawley and Syder 1983) the puzzle of nativelike
selection is how the language learner knows which of the well-formed sentences of a
language are nativelike. How are normal usages distinguished from those grammatical-
ly correct sequences which are unnatural or highly marked? Grammaticality does not
ensure idiomaticity. Many sentences are called by the g.amma.; few are chosen as ñt for
normal use.
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The narrative 'translation' in (5) is grammatical but strikes native speakers of
English as bizarre, something like a literal translation from another language. To sound
like a native we have to know'how things are said'. This seems to Ee partly a matter of
knowing the kinds of form-meaning pairings treated here under the heading of speech
formulas. Indeed, formulas are by definition idioms of a language-culture system, that
is, standard ways of talking about familiar ideas.
Here the question of creativity comes up. Do we have to talk exclusively in clichés in
order to speak idiomatically? Can we say nothing new? Clearly such is not the case. But
much as people like novelty, we like it in limited doses, and we like it to come wrapped in
familiar packaging. Effective creativity is highly constrained, comprising variations on
familiar themes. The rules of syntax provide certain constraints but evidently they
allow a freedom that is often too great for the purposes ofordinary speech exchange,
which demands that ideas be packaged for a fast ride. Formulas seem to provide the
right combination of familiarity and flexibility. English has, for example, tens of
thousands of schematic and partly lexicalised formulas whose highly restricted
grammars allow partly new ideas to be presented in a familiar form. Some idea of the
size of the formula lexicon may be gauged by counting the number of formulas which
individual words participate in. The most common verbs, such as haae, get, take, go, come
a¡d do each figure in several hundred formulas. Verbs of the second and third rank in
frequency, such as hnow, see and thinh, each ñgure in several score. The following, for
example, are among the formulaic expressions which fáinÁ occurs in:
6. Come to think of it, ...
What do you think?
I thought better of it.
Think nothing o/ it!
Think it over.
I hardly dare think about it.
It doesn't bear thinking.about.
$usQ think about it for a [moment, second, minute, while, etc.]
I'd think none the worse of you ...
I think I'd have done the same thing in his [shoes, situation, etc.]
Do you think I came down in the last shower?
Do you think I was born yesterday?
Who do you think you are?
I don't think much of that [suggestion, idea, etc.].
Can you think of a better one?
I (just) can't think straight.
I'll need a few days to think it over.
I haven't stopped to think about it.
Think twice before you PREDICATE PHRASE.
Who (ever) would have thought it!
I don't think NP will like that.
I think a lot of
NP¡ thinks the world of NP.¡
NP¡ thinks the sun shines out of NP.¡'s [bottom, arse, etc.].
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NP¡ thinks PRO¡ is really somebody'
NP¡ thinks PROi's shit doesn't stink.
NP¡ thinks he's the cat's pyjamas.
NPi thinks nothing of NP.¡.
NP thinks nothing of V-ing NP (e.g. walking 50 miles).
Think what that could mean to NP.
I though you'd never ask!
[S, NP, AOJ], I don't think. (ironic tone).
I was (ust, only) thinking aloud.
Think before you [open your mouth, speak].
I couldn't think of [a single thing, anything] to say.
I don't know what to think!
I thought you knew better [than that, than to S].
I thought you knew!
I think so.
I thought I told you not to do that!
What I think is, ...
Do you really think so?
He only thinks of himself.
He thinks highly of you.
Think again!
The questi«ln of what is involved in saying things that make sense in a particular
language community, is discussed by Keesing ( 1979) and especially by Grace ( 1984)6. It
appears that coherence of discourse, as this is perceived by members of a speech
community, is very closely tied to conventional ways of talking about particular subject
matters. That is why translation is dif{icult 
- 
whether across languages or from
specialist discourse t«¡ discourse that will be understood by a layman. If the target
speech tradition lacks conventional ways of talking about the subject matter in question
c«rhere¡rt translation is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Even if the tradition has
such conventi<lnal usages translation may still be difficult; it is necessary that the ways of
talking match in conceptual particulars. This is so because to a large extent subject
matters do n«rt exist 'out there' but are created by language (see fn. 2). Our discourse
about 'things' is in fact discourse about a conceptual world that is linguistically
constructed. And such worlds are to some extent specific t<l particular groups of people
(within or across language communities) who share a way of talking.
For examples of linguistically-constructed conceptual worlds that are not readily
intelligible to outsiders we do not need to look beyond our own language. The ways of
talking characteristic of any specialist group, such as the medical profession, or
linguists, or linguists of a particular school, illustrate the point. Thus, the Chomskyan
this question has also been a major concern of certain schools of sociology, especially
ethnomethodology, and ofordinary language philosophers, and has begun to occupy linguists investigating
conversation and other forms of discourse. However, with some exceptions (e.9. Grice 1975), the focus in
these investigations has been on decoding rather than encoding, on how people make sense of what is said
rather than how speakers decide, from among the many ways they might say things, what to say.
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picture of language which became widely adopted during the 1960s was constructed
with metaphors, flow chart diagrams and a whole new way of talking derived partly
from mathematics. 'A language is an infinite set of sentences', 'surface structures are
labelled bracketings of formatives', 'structure A is derived from structure B',
'transformations convert deep structures to surface forms', 'rule A is ordered before
rule B', and so on. A good deal of the subject matter of Chomskyan linguistics simply
did not exist, for all practical purposes, before it became part of a particular theory of
language. This situation may be generally as true of scientific theories as it is of religious
cosmologies.
I do not wish to say that all conventional ways of talking are speech formulas as
defined here. However, I am saying that speech formulas make up a large part of what
Grace means by conventional ways of talking.
A final remark about the distinction between designations and ad hoc descriptions.
It is part of both speakers' and hearers' competence to be able to distinguish standard,
i.e. lexicalised names for things from ad hoc descriptions. Knowledge of formulaic
expressions is constitutive in this distinction. However, it should be noted that
lexicalisation is a matter of degree 
- 
expressions which describe or characterize a thing
may be more or less lexicalised; in English there are more than 20 criteria which
indicate whether or not an expression is a standard form-meaning pairing (Pawley in
press).
CaN rHr cRAMMAR-LExrcoN MoDEL ACCoMMoDATE spEECH ronuules?
This final section touches on the question of whether the grammar-lexicon model of
language can accommodate speech formulas, or the sorts of facts which the speech
formula construct attempts to make sense of.
As it stands now, the discipline of linguistics does not have much to say about most
of the kinds of competence listed in ( I ). To be precise, structural linguistics has a great
deal to say about (a), (b) and certain ingredients of (c), and about ingredient (k-ii), and
little or nothing to say about the others.
These observations should not be regarded as censorious of modern linguistics.
They refer to omissions, things excluded from analyses. But you should regard these
omissions as shortcomings, as regrettnblc, only if you think descriptive or theoretical
linguists presume to be centrally concerned with understanding linguistic competence
in its broadest, vernacular sense. Or if you think linguistics ought to be centrally
occupied with this task. On this matter opinion within the discipline seems to be
divided. Quite rightly so 
- 
there is no reason why all linguists should study the same
things.
When I entered linguistics, more than 20 years ago, grammar was the big deal 
-either compiling grammars of particular languages or working in grammatical theory.
Along with most linguists, I continue to believe that these last two enterprises should
remain among the central concerns of our discipline. However, certain experiences
have disturbed my initial naive belief that a comprehensive account of a language can
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be achieved by compiling a grammar and a lexicon according to grammarians'
principlesT.
The single most powerful experience was attempting to describe Kalam, a language
spoken by about 15,000 people living in the Bismark and Schrader Ranges of Papua
New Guinea. In the mid-1960s I spent about a year among the Kalam-speaking
community of Kaironk, and wrote a grammar of the language for my doctoral thesis.
Later, an anthropologist, another linguist and I put together a dictionary.
The grammar, in the tradition of the time, provided a fairly detailed account of the
formal structure of Kalam sentences, but left me feeling dissatisfied. Kalam is an
unusual language 
- 
verbs, for example, are a closed set, with fewer than 100 members.
Some of the most characteristic and striking features of the language were not captured
in the formal description. Compared to other languages I was familiar with
-Indo-European and Malayo-Polynesian- Kalam has distinctive ways of talkingabout everyday experiences such as seeing, hearing, tasting, feeling cold or sick,
gathering firewood and going hunting.
The following comparisons of translation equivalents illustrate some of the
differences between English and Kalam ways of talking:
7. English Kalnm
wdn nq-
eye perceive
hear tmwd nn-
ear perceive
dream usn nq-
sleep perceive
think gos nq-
mind perceive
taste ñb nq-
consume percelve
feel (deliberately) d nq-
hold perceive
TPerhaps it would be more accurate here to speak of 'assumption' rather than 'beliefl. I might argue, with
many fellow linguists, that I have never realy beli¿oed tha¡ grammar-lexicon descriptions provide a
comprehensive account of a language. But actions speak louder than beliefs. What really counts in the
formation of a scholarly tradition (as Grace 1984: l9-22 points out) is not the personal beliefs of individual
scholars; what matters are the assumptions underlying the prevailing practices which make up the
tradition- what subject matters its adherents attend to or ignore, their ways of talking about the subject
matters, and so on.
see
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like, approve go§ tep I nq-
mind good perceive
mind
balws ageh (twmd) nqbn
plane it-sounded (ear) I-perceived
haj kury apekt nqbyn
pig odour it-came l-perceived
d oP-
get come
d am-
get go
arn d oP @y-, ñ-)
go Bet come put, give
am mon pk d oP q-
go wood break get come put
am kmn pk d oF ad ñb-
go game kill get come cook consume
97
dislike
8. I heard the plane
I smelt the pig
9. bring
take
fetch
10. fetch ñrewood
hunt game-mammals,
catch game-mammals
t, fl\,-
percelve
tm,E
bad
gos
gather pandanus nuts arn alqaw hab th d oF
go pandanus nut cut get come
o¿ ñb-
cook consume
(7) and (8) give an idea of how Kalam speak about events of perception and
cognition. Each such event is analysed into components, such as the part of the body
which does the perceiving, or the sequence of acts which are necessary for perception to
occur. Thus, tasting involves, first, consuming something by mouth, then perceiving;
feeling involves touching something, then perceiving. In Kalam one cannot hear or
smell an ohject, such as a plane or a pig. The plane must make a sound, which one then
hears; the pig must have or give off an odour which com¿s fo one.
(9) and (10) refer to action events. Here again Kalam shows a highly analytic
pattern. In (9) we see an approximate equivalence in the overall information given in
the translation pairs, the difference being that Kalam explicitly breaks each event down
into a series of acts while English packs the same information into one verb. In (10) we
begin to see another kind of difference between the two languages, having to do with
what kinds of information must be mentioned when giving an account of an event.
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In English it is normal to refer to a complex event, made up of several component
events occurring in sequence, by mentioning only one or two components, which stand
for the whole. For example, in answer to the question What did you do today? people
might answer We went to the marh¿tltlteatrelswimming poollpark (and did the normal things
one does there), or We caught three fi.sh or We went and gallured a lot of firewood. When
talking about any action in Kalam, however, it is normal to indicate at least the
following:
ll
The first component tells whether the actor was already at the scene of the action
(indicated, e.g. by the verb ml-'be, stay') or whether he had to move there (e.g. am-'go').
Component 2 says what happened there. In (10) the actions each involve something
bging done to an object: killing game-mammals, cutting down nuts, etc. Component 3
t6[ls whether or not the actor stayed at the scene or moved, and whether or not he took
the affected object with him. The sequence dap'getcome'which recurs in (10)indicates
. 
that the actor returned to base (his home or camp or the narrator's previous point of
"teference) and that he carried the affected object with him. Component 4 rounds off
the description of the event by telling what the actor did with the transported object, or
' with himself. In the case of firewood one stacks it or burns it, according to need; in the
case of pandanus nuts and game mammals one usually bakes and eats them.
Why are Kalam ways of talking about events difficult to describe in a grammar?
Flaven't I just described some of the conventions above?
First, remember that structural linguistics is primarily a formal discipline , by which
I mean that its strengths have been in dealing with linguistic form rather than with
meaning or function. In writing grammars the tradition is to consider formal syntactic
Categories and relations as basic. Structural grammarians write mainly about such
things as transitive constructions, relative clauses, nominalizations, heads and
attributes, etc. It is n<¡t customary to begin with function and say "Language X has
conceptual categories'Action Event'and'Cognitive Event', which involve the following
elements". "If a speaker wishes to talk about hunting he must phrase things as follows; if
he is talking about harvesting root crops he must say such and such". It may well be
possible to write grarnmars in this way, but I have never seen such a grammars.
EOf course, many insightful papers have been written about the semantic styles of- particular languages.
For European languages, especially, there is a large literature on idioms, proverbs, etc., and linguists have
recently turned tg the study of metaphor (e.g. lakoff and Johnson. 1980). In the collected essays of Whorf(Carrol 1956) and Dixon (1984) 
-to name just two anthropological linguists- we find pioneeringinvestigations of some aspects of the semantics of lesser-known languages. Talmy ( 1985) develops a typology
of patterns by which languages map semantic patterns onto surface forms. Wierzbicka has broken new
ground in semantic analysis (e.9. Wierzbicka 1985). However, comprehensive grammars, taking complex
I
MOVEMENT
OF ACTOR
FROM POINT
OF REFERENCE
TO SCENE
OF ACTION
2
ACTION
AT SCENE
3
MOVEMENT OF
ACTOR AND
AFFECTED
oBJECT TO
POINT OF
REFERENCE
4
FATE OF ACTOR/
OBJECT AT
POINT OF
REFERENCE
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Although there must be many languages in the world which, like Kalam, have a
semantic style that differs radically from Indo-European norms, it seems that other
grammarians have also found it hard to make the semantic style of a language shine
through a form-based description.
In any case, a grammar consists of generalizations. Particular expressions,
instantiations of the rules of grammar 
- 
such as expressions meaning 'perceive with
the eyes', 'go get come', 'go get wood, bring it and stack it'- are not singled out for
mention. All potential expressions are equal in the sight of Grammar.
How then do we single out those well-formed sequences which are institutionalised
from those that are not? Or should we make no attempt to single them out? I chose to
list many well-formed clause-length expressions (or more exactly, to list the lexicalised
and partly lexicalised formulas which they instantiate) in the Kalam dictionary,
whenever I felt that they were the standard way of expressing a familiar idea.
I felt somewhat guilty about doing so. It seemed that this procedure was breaking
three descriptive principles cherished by structural linguists. One is the principle of
precision. There were no clear grounds for a cutoff point between expressions to be put
in the dictionary and expressions to be left out. We included the clause-length formulas
by which Kalam refer to'enemy'and 'market'. 'Your enemies' are'people you fight
with':
byn-b penpen napm T\ D 0at2
man-woman reciprocally you-fight(people) pl.
A 'market' is a'place where they exchange (= buy-and-sell) things
o
13. tp tap tawpay /4.
'/o.place thing they-exchange c{í
But what about other well-formed expressions for less familiar ideas, expressions which
are something less than common usages and something more than ad hoc descriptions?
Our rule of thumb was that common usages were in, possible but unusual ways of saying
things were out, and everything in between remained problematic in status.
A second principle is that of economy. Linguists are a cost-conscious lot, ever-ready
to apply Occam's Razor to their products. Lees ( 1966: xxxi) states a view which has been
prevalent in descriptive linguistics for much of this century:
A constraint to maximum generality (measured hopefully by some notational property
called "simplicity") is not special to linguistics; it characterizes any scientific enterprise.... For
us it would mean, roughly, that given two descriptions... there is no point in preferring that
one which contains superfluous assumptions or apparatus...
One kind of superfluity disdained by grammarians is the duplication of
information in two different parts of a description, as when the same form-meaning
conceptual constructions (e.g., types of events and situations) as the point of departure, in the way that
syntacticians take S, NP, etc. as theirs, have not yet (as far as I know) been compiled.
\
a
¡, .i)
I
11
c2
BtB! i:r'iE.;i
\\
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pairing is specified once by the rules of syntax and semantics and once again in a lexical
entry. One specification is enough 
- 
the question of whether a given pairing is to be
handled by one component or another is deemed to be an empirical issue. Twenty years
ago, Chomsky (1965:184) commented on the handling of words formed by productive
derivational processes:
Clearly, the words d¿struction, refual, etc. will not be entered in the lexicon as such. Rather,
d.estroy and, refwe wlll be entered.... A nominalization transformation will apply at the
appropriate stage o[ derivation.
A few years later he revised his views, ñnding grounds for treating derived nominals as
lexical items and for dropping the transformational derivation in this case. The details
of this example do not matter. What is significant is that the grammarian is expected to
make a choice between one analysis or another.
The third principle, already alluded to above, is that the object of a linguistic
description should be grammatical competence, and that this competence is
independent of knowledge about whether a particular well-formed.sequence is a
common usage, occurs rarely or has not yet been observed to occur. It is also
independent of knowledge about the rules of pragmatic use and interpretation of
products of the grammar. Call this the autonomy principle: a language, in the
grammar-lexicon sense of grammarians, is a system of knowledge separate from
knowledge of the world, cultural and pragmatic. The operation of the autonomy and
economy principles can be seen in Lees' influential work on complex nominal
expressions in English, where he proposed that many nominal compounds be treated
not as lexical items but as products of regular syntactic processes nominalizing verbal
structures, and in Lees'critical remarks on the attempts of Jespersen and others to
distinguish'compounds' from free expressions:
[T] here simply is no neat physical or semantic criterion for compounds, ... there need not be
any such, and ... the point of linguistic research is m find grammatical descriptions, not to
classify physical or semantic "objects" (Lees 1966: xxiv).
ln this view of Iinguistic description there is no place for a concept such as 'name of
a thing', 'nameworthy thing' or 'familiar idea'. There are only form-meaning
connections which are either predictable or unpredictable (lexical) according to the
grammar.
I do not believe that speech formulas can be accomodated within a descriptive
framework which adheres to these three principles and to the conception of language
which they impose. If one were to write a description of Kalam accordingly, the list of
lexical items referring to events would contain only the 90 or so verb stems plus a
handful of idioms. If your goal is to describe what is grammatical in Kalam that may be
reasonable. But if you want to describe what it takes to speak Kalam like a native, it is
plainly absurd.
However, the guilt which I felt in this matter was surely unnecessary. Because the
descriptive principles outlined above do not reflect the way language users structure
their knowledge. Instead, they represent a set of aesthetic principles and assumptions
which have been adopted by a particular group of scholars, and which, in association
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with particular analytic procedures, allow sense to be made of a certain range of
linguistic data.
There is, within the field of language description, a separate tradition of research
with a long and honorable history, which tackles a somewhat different (but
overlapping) range of data in a different way. What we were struggling to do in the
dictionary of Kalam was in essence the same as conventional dictionary-makers have
been doing for generations.
The compilers of the Oxford English Dictionary, say, or of Webster's New Twentieth
Century Dictionary of English, deal with a different body of data from that treated by the
grammar-lexicon model. The differences stem not only from their distinctive purposes
but from having different notions of what a language is. A dictionary such as Webster's
treats a language as a system of conventions by which particular groups of people
communicate about particular worlds. The dictionary is a kind of encyclopaedia of a
culture (or collection of sub-cultures)e. Let us call any expression included in the
dictionary a lexeme. What counts as a lexeme for the compilers of Webster's is any
expression which has a high degree of institutionalisation in any English-speaking
community as either the name of a thing or a way of saying something. Semantic and
grammatical regularity are no bar to inclusionl0. Thus, Webster's lists such well-formed
common usages as bloodstain, blood.-stained, blood.-colored, bottle-hold¿r, forgettable,
forgettablenex, forgetful, forgetfulnex, forgetfully and forgetter. However, it does not list
other possible forms such as dyesfain, paint-stain, sword-holder or unicorn-holder.In respect
of complex expressions which are in common use practice is somewhat inconsistent.
Proverbs and idioms are likely to be recorded, but generally, the longer an expression
is, the less likely it is to be found in Webster's.
ln this view of language, there is no cutoff point between lexemes and non-lexemic
expressions, between common usages and nonceforms, between institutlbnalised and
ad hoc ways of talking about things. There is a continuum. And this continuum exists at,
say, the clause level no less than at the level of derived words or nominal compounds. In
these matters Kalam is not different from English, except in its greater reliance on
complex lexemes. The cutoff point that we actually make in dictionaries is determined
by practical limitations or purpose rather than principle.
While the most highly regarded dictionaries include many formulaic expressions,
they hardly provide systematic descriptions of these, still less of the formulas which
underlie them. Formuias present numérous problems of description which we cannot
expect the traditional tools of lexicography or grammatical analysis to cope with. Each
formula is a sort of mini grammar, a body of conventions connecting form and
meaning, some of which are particular to that formula. We have already noted that the
rules and usages which make up the 'grammar' of formulas are diverse in nature,
eThat dictionaries are not in principle different from encylclopaedias is argued by Haiman (1980). I
read Keesing (1979) as saying that a description ofwhat it takes to speak a language should not be sharply
distinguished from an ethnography of the language community.
roMatthews (1974: 193) distinguishes'lexicalised' from 'institutionalised'expression without claiming
that there is a sharp boundary. Here, however, he adopts a grammarian's view ofwhat counts as a lexeme
(indivisible compounds, like ilishumslur) versus non-lexical institutionalised collocations (such as sith johe ,
where the modifier uar¡ may apply just to sicl). l.aymen and lexicographers do not make such a distinction;
the grammatical criteria for the proposed distinction are in any case problematic, as Matthews acknowledges.
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representing not only grammatical constraints in the traditional sense but most or all of
the elements of linguistic competence listed in (l a-k): idiomaticity, musical
conventions, contextual appropriateness, etc.
We may extend struclural notions of grarnmar and lexicon to accomodate formulas,
but in doing so we necessarily change the character of the description in rather
fundamental waysll.
CoNcr-usl<¡N
The most fundamental change is in the view of what language is and how it is organised.
In order to make sense of speech formulas it is necessary to regard a language as a
collection of ways of talking about things (as Grace puts it), expressing ideas (old or new)
in a manner that is conventional (grammatical, idiomatic, etc.).
It is the 'things' that are hardest to marry with the structuralist tradition. 'Ways of
talking', 'idiomatic forms of expressio¡' 
-t[¡sss notions, while distinct from 'ways oftalking grammatically', are at least partly amenable to description using the tools for
analysing forms which are the chief glories of structural linguistics. But linguistics has
no technical construct corresponding to the vernacular'idea', 'subject matter', 'thing
talked about', as an independent entity rather than as what a particular utterance or
expression means. For example, while'sentence', 'clause','verb phrase'and the like are
posited as types of formal constructions which can be analysed independently of
meaning, we are not used to talking about 'events', 'situations' and 'acts' as kinds of
conceptual constructions, analysable into conceptual elements independently of form.
Only at the level of lexemes is there a place for talking about particular concepts as part
of a language-culture system.
Yet there are various linguistic abilities which hinge on knowledge of conceptual
contructions and elements as entities separable from particular forms. When fluent
bilinguals translate, for example, it is not (usually) equivalence of form that they seek
but equivalence of meaning; they try to match ideas, to capture the thing that was said.
Grace (1981, 1984) discusses this point at some length. The ability to paraphrase, to say
the same thing in different words and different styles, depends on being able to isolate
the conceptual elements. Speaking idiomatically, or recognising that someone's
utterance is intended to be understood as a request formula and not as a statement, call
for the language user to know that particular subject matters are talked about in
particular ways.
In dealing with speech formulas, then, we are led to much the same view that
Marjorie Shostak took of her task of mastering the !Kung language: it is necessary ro
know not only how things are said, but the kinds of things that are said and done with
words. This kind of linguistic competence is inseparable from a broader cultural and
social competence.
¡ lOver the last l0 or l5 years theoretical linguists have begun to develop a richer conception of lexicon,
including the awarding of lexical status to expressions formerly regarded as transformationally derived.
However, the changes envisaged as needed for describing speech formulas are ofa more fundamental nature
than a trade-off of material between lexicon and other components of a Brammar.
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I do not suggest that every linguist should try to mine this broader linguistic
competence. Ways of talking about things constitute a more complex ore than we are
used to extracting or analysing. Our machinery is mainly designed for obtaining pure
syntax, of which the supply is not yet exhausted. But there is a much larger supply of the
complex aggregate that is language, in the vernacular sense, awaiting excavation. If
linguists are able to mine this rich material they may be doing something that is of quite
general value, as well as intellectually challenging.
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